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AVOIDING THE OBVIOUS: PLAIN
MEANING AND THE
ENDANGERMENT OF ALASKA’S
HUNTING LAWS IN KINMON V.
STATE
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ABSTRACT
This Comment critiques the court of appeals’ statutory interpretation of
Alaska’s hunting laws in Kinmon v. State and proposes legislative reform to
correct those judicially created errors. Kinmon arose from a series of hunts
between 2009 and 2011 during which nonresident hunters did not pay for their
big game tags until after the completion of their hunts. The guide leading these
hunts was charged with violating section 16.05.340(a)(15) of the Alaska
Statutes, which prohibits nonresidents from hunting big game without
“previously purchasing” a big game tag. The Alaska Court of Appeals held in
favor of the guide, reasoning that “previously purchasing” was ambiguous and
could be understood to permit purchase of a big game tag after a hunt. This
reading of the statute is faulty under the plain meaning canon of statutory
construction and has deleterious policy implications. To address this error, this
Comment proposes a legislative amendment to section 16.06.340(a)(15) of the
Alaska Statutes to clarify that “previously purchasing” a game tag requires
purchase prior to a hunt.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Alaska is, by some accounts, the most hunter-friendly state in the
nation.1 Hunting is central to the state’s culture, both traditionally2 and
contemporaneously.3 Hunting not only enriches Alaska’s culture, it also
contributes to the state’s coffers: in 2019, Alaska netted nearly $40 million
from the sale of fishing and hunting licenses, stamps, and tags.4 Over $7.5
million of that revenue came from the sale of nonresident big game tags.5
However, the Alaska Court of Appeals’ decision in Kinmon v. State6
threatens this valuable source of revenue and oversight created by the big
game tag system.
The State charged Richard Kinmon, a licensed big game hunter,7
with violating section 16.05.340(a)(15) of the Alaska Statutes 8 following a
series of hunts between 2009 and 2011.9 During these hunts, Kinmon
allegedly allowed his clients to take game without “previously
purchasing” big game tags.10 At trial, Kinmon argued the statutory
meaning of “previously purchasing” could reasonably be understood to
include the provision of a tag with a promise to pay in the future, after a
hunt.11 The jury was presumably unconvinced by this argument as it
convicted Kinmon on eight counts that turned, in part, on the phrase’s
1. Kyle Hey, Top 10 Most Hunter Friendly States, BOWHUNTING.COM (July 24,
2019), https://www.bowhunting.com/blog/2019/07/24/top-10-most-hunterfriendly-states/; see also Ben O’Brien, HUNTING Ranks the Best States for Meat
Eaters, PETERSEN’S HUNTING (Nov. 27, 2013), https://www.petersenshunting.com
/editorial/hunting-ranks-best-states-meat-eaters/272907.
2. See generally Jeffrey W. Stowers, Jr., A Starving Culture: Alaskan Native
Villages’ Fight to Use Traditional Hunting and Fishing Grounds, 40 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
41 (2015) (describing the historical importance of subsistence hunting to Alaska
Native culture and the threat to that way of life presented by the modern legal
regime).
3. See Jon Schuppe, The Fight over Alaska’s Hunting Rules Run Deeper than
Doughnuts to Bait Bears, NBC NEWS (June 14, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/
news/us-news/fight-over-alaska-s-hunting-rules-runs-deeper-usingdoughnuts-n882811 (describing unique features of Alaska’s contemporary
recreational and subsistence hunting culture in relation to changes in federal land
regulation under the Trump Administration).
4. DEP’T OF FISH AND GAME, 2019 CALENDAR YEAR LICENSES AND TAGS ISSUED
(2020), http://www.adfg.alaska.gov/static/license/pdfs/licenses_stamps_tags_
issued_2019.pdf.
5. Id.
6. 451 P.3d 392 (Alaska Ct. App. 2019).
7. Under Alaska law, ‘big game’ includes black, brown, and grizzly bears,
bison, caribou, elk, goats, moose, sheep, and wolves. ALASKA STAT. § 08.54.790(2)
(2018).
8. Id. § 16.05.340(a)(15) (2018).
9. Kinmon, 451 P.3d 392 at 394.
10. Id. at 396.
11. Id. at 394.
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definition.12 On appeal, the court of appeals reversed four of those counts
based upon a construction of “previously purchasing” under which a
binding promise to pay after a hunt is sufficient to satisfy the statute’s
requirements.13
This Comment critiques the holding in Kinmon from both a legal and
a policy perspective. As such, the Alaska legislature should correct the
error of Kinmon by clarifying the statutory meaning of “previously
purchasing.” In making this argument, this Comment first presents
Alaska’s well-established canons of statutory construction and introduces
Alaska’s big game hunting laws in Part II. Part III then describes Kinmon
in more detail to contextualize the application of those canons to the
statutory scheme. Finally, Part IV shows that a proper application of the
canons and salient policy considerations merit legislative action to correct
the error in Kinmon. Specifically, the legislature should statutorily clarify
that big game tags must be purchased prior to the commencement of a
hunt.

II. BACKGROUND
To fully comprehend why Kinmon was wrongly decided, it is critical
to both understand the tools of statutory construction that were misused
and appreciate the statutory scheme to which those tools were
misapplied. As to the former consideration, the court found the statute’s
language sufficiently ambiguous to merit applying the rule of lenity.14
This most-straightforward of canons, the “plain meaning rule,” is well
known and used throughout the nation’s various judicial systems.15 In
Alaska, the core of the rule is constructing statutes in accordance with
their common usage.16 Put bluntly, “[u]nless otherwise defined, words
will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common

12. Id. at 396.
13. Id. at 399.
14. The court determined that “if a statute is unresolvably [sic] ambiguous
following [plain meaning] analysis, the rule of lenity requires that it be construed
in the defendant’s favor.” Id. at 397. The court then found that “previously
purchas[ed] could reasonably be construed to encompass the delivery of goods
with a binding promise to pay in the near future” and applied the rule of lenity.
Id. at 399.
15. See, e.g., Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 381 (2014) (quoting Hartford
Underwrites, Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)). “When
[a] statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts – at least where the
disposition required by the text is not absurd – is to enforce it according to its
terms.” Id.
16. See, e.g., Homer Elec. Ass’n v. Towsley, 841 P.2d 1042, 1043–44 (Alaska
1992).
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meaning.”17 The plain meaning of a statutory term may be further
clarified by legislative history and the term’s context in a larger statutory
scheme.18 To this end, Alaska courts use a “sliding scale” approach in
which the plainer the statutory language, the more convincing contrary
legislative history must be to negate that plain meaning.19 In the criminal
context, if, after applying this analysis, “the legislature’s intent cannot be
ascertained or remains ambiguous,” then the rule of lenity is applied.20 A
court applying the rule construes the ambiguous statute in favor of the
defendant.21
In Kinmon, these interpretive canons were improperly applied to the
statutory scheme governing the regulation of hunting in Alaska.22
Specifically, the court of appeals applied them to section 16.05.340(a)(15)
of the Alaska Statutes.23 Under that statute, nonresidents are prohibited
from hunting big game without “previously purchasing” a big game
tag.24 The significance of this statute is hard to understate as nonresidents
have purchased sixty-seven percent of all big game tags sold in Alaska
since 1977.25 In the past decade, tags purchased by nonresidents
accounted for $43,873,055, or approximately ninety-seven percent of the
17. State v. Niedermeyer, 14 P.3d 265, 272 (Alaska 2000).
18. See, e.g., FDIC v. Laidlaw Transit, 21 P.3d 344, 351 (Alaska 2001) (quoting
Homer Elec. Ass’n v. Towsley, 841 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Alaska 1992) (Compton, J.,
dissenting)) (“[B]ecause ‘plain meaning’ cannot exist in a vacuum, ambiguity is
necessarily a creature of context. ‘As the Supreme Court has stated, “in
ascertaining the plain meaning of a statute, the court must look to the particular
language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.”‘“).
19. Alaska Spine Ctr., LLC v. Mat-Su Valley Med. Ctr. LLC, 440 P.3d 176, 181
(Alaska 2019) (quoting Adamson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 333 P.3d 5, 11
(Alaska 2014)).
20. Ward v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 288 P.3d 94, 97–98 (Alaska 2012); see also
Anchorage v. Brooks, 397 P.3d 346, 349 (Alaska Ct. App. 2017) (stating a statute
can be termed ambiguous only when its meaning remains “unresolvably [sic]
confused”).
21. See Ward, 288 P.3d at 97–98 (quoting State v. Andrews, 707 P.2d 900, 907
(Alaska Ct. App. 1985), aff’d, 723 P.2d 85, 86 (Alaska 1986)) (“If a statute
establishing a penalty is susceptible of more than one meaning, it should be
construed so as to provide the most lenient penalty.”); see also De Nardo v. State,
819 P.2d 903, 907 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (“[An ambiguous criminal] statute must
be construed in favor of the defendant and against the government. But this rule
of lenity or strict construction comes into play only when, after employing normal
methods of statutory construction, the legislature’s intent cannot be ascertained
or remains ambiguous.”).
22. See Kinmon v. State, 451 P.3d 392, 397–99 (Alaska Ct. App. 2019); infra Part
III.
23. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.340(a)(15) (2018).
24. Id.
25. See ALASKA DEP’T OF FISH AND GAME, BIG GAME TAGS, 1962 TO PRESENT
(2020), http://www.adfg.alaska.gov/static/license/pdfs/big_game_ tags_19622019.pdf (listing the number of big game tags issued each year since 1962 broken
down by game type, year, and recipients’ residential status).
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$45,172,155 in revenue from all big game tags.26 As important as the
revenue generated by section 16.05.340(a)(15) is, the statute’s wider goal
of wildlife management is framed by the Alaska Constitution’s directive
that “wildlife . . . belonging to the State shall be utilized, developed, and
maintained on the sustained yield principle.”27

III. KINMON V. STATE
In Kinmon, the Alaska Court of Appeals faced a deceivingly simple
question concerning big game hunting: whether statutory requirements
to have “previously purchas[ed]” hunting tags require the actual
payment of money or simply “a promise to pay in the future.”28 The court
split on this question, but the majority ultimately held that the term
“could reasonably be construed to encompass the delivery of goods with
a binding promise to pay in the near future.”29
The question of statutory interpretation revolved around Mr.
Richard Kinmon, a big game guide licensed in Alaska.30 The state charged
and convicted Kinmon of eleven misdemeanor offenses arising out of
hunting excursions he guided between 2009 and 2011; eight of these
charges included offenses involving whether or not Kinmon’s clients had
“previously purchas[ed]” statutorily required big game tags.31 Section
16.05.340(a)(15) of the Alaska Statutes states that “[a] nonresident may not
take a big game animal without previously purchasing a numbered,
nontransferable, appropriate tag, issued under this paragraph.”32 At trial
and on appeal, Kinmon argued that the term “previously purchasing”
was ambiguous as to whether or not nonresidents must pay money before
the hunt or simply must “promise to pay in the future.”33
The hunting expeditions in question involved leading nonresident
hunters on moose and sheep hunts.34 For non-Alaskans to hunt big game,
they must submit the requisite forms to the Alaska Department of Fish
26. ALASKA DEP’T OF FISH AND GAME, STATE OF ALASKA HUNT/SPORT FISH &
GAME LICENSE GROSS REVENUE BY CALENDAR YEAR, 2011–2020 RECAP (2020),
http://www.adfg.alaska.gov/static/license/pdfs/1926_2019_licenses_stamps_t
ags_revenue.pdf.
27. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 4. Cf. Bertil Näslund, The Principle of Sustained
Yield and Optimal Forest Management, 79 SCANDANAVIAN J. OF ECON. 1 (1977)
(describing a formula of forest harvesting designed to ensure long-term
production).
28. Kinmon v. State, 451 P.3d 392, 394 (Alaska Ct. App. 2019).
29. Id. at 399.
30. Id. at 394.
31. Id. at 395.
32. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.340(a)(15) (2018).
33. Kinmon, 451 P.3d at 394.
34. Id.
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and Game (“Department”).35 One of the required forms is submitted to
the Department prior to the hunt, while another report is due to the
Department following the actual hunting trip, regardless of the hunter’s
success in shooting big game.36 While Kinmon was convicted on charges
concerning three separate hunting excursions, the court of appeals
ultimately treated these excursions differently.
The first four charges Kinmon faced concerned a sheep hunt he
guided in 2009 with an out-of-state hunter, John Maser.37 One of these
charges included going on the sheep hunt “without a valid (i.e.,
“previously purchas[ed]”) nonresident sheep tag and/or harvest ticket”
and other charges of knowingly failing to report the hunt and public
records tampering.38 Because of Kinmon’s backdating of hunting tags,
these convictions were upheld by the appellate court and were not altered
by shifting interpretations of “previously purchas[ed].”39
However, the court of appeals found stark differences between
Maser’s hunt and Kinmon’s other disputed hunts concerning grizzly
bears and moose with the non-Alaskans Joseph Hahn and Shelley Ailts.40
While Hahn and Kinmon completed the requisite paperwork before
commencing the bear hunt, Hahn did not pay for the tag until “after the
hunt was completed,” per Kinmon’s recommendation.41 Three of the
convictions “potentially hinged on a legal conclusion that a ‘purchase’ did
not occur until after Hahn paid for the bear tag.”42 Kinmon pursued the
same sort of post-payment scheme with the third hunting expedition,
with his conviction for that hunt also turning on the correct interpretation
of “previously purchas[ed].”43
While the trial court determined the “commonly understood
meaning” of “previously purchasing” was “that a ‘purchase’ did not take
place until money changed hands,” it allowed both sides to present
differing interpretations to the jury, with no jury instructions on the
provided phrase.44 The court of appeals, however, disagreed with this
procedure. The court was convinced by Kinmon’s argument that
“purchase” had alternative meanings in other states’ hunting regulations
worth reviewing, such as California’s relevant statutory definition of “an
offer to buy, purchase, barter, exchange, or trade,” which the court
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id. at 394–95.
Id. at 395.
Id.
Id. at 400.
Id. at 396.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 394–95.
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contrasted with the narrower definition in Florida’s law that it found akin
to the district court’s interpretation.45
The court of appeals did not afford much weight to the state’s
persuasive policy arguments.46 The crux of the State’s policy argument
was that hunters may be less likely to pay for the hunting tags post-hunt;
but the court, not convinced more nonresidents would shirk their
responsibilities to actually pay for unsuccessful hunts, noted that “it [was]
not clear that this policy interest would be undermined by allowing a
hunter to obtain a tag before the hunt with a promise to pay at the close
of the hunt.”47 Instead of following the trial court in “appl[ying the]
ordinary usage” of “previously purchasing,” the appellate court held the
term could mean nothing more than a promise to pay in the future.48
The court also relied on its unpublished opinion in State v. Chun,49 in
which it held that “substantial and unresolvable ambiguity in existing
law” led to the rule of lenity being applied.50 Here, the court ruled it was
error for the trial court to allow both parties to present competing
definitions of “previously purchasing” and instead sided with Kinmon’s
interpretation.51 The court of appeals then held that “previously
purchasing” requires nothing more than “a binding promise to pay”
under the statute.52
Judge Harbison, however, dissented from the majority’s opinion,
finding no statutory ambiguity in “previously purchasing.”53 Applying
the canon of statutory construction of plain meaning, Judge Harbison
determined that “previously purchased . . . clearly requires a nonresident
to complete the act of purchasing a tag—including paying for it—before
the nonresident may take a big game animal.”54 She went on to point out
the lack of similarity between the California statute and Alaska’s, noting
that the California statute’s term does not relate to how tags are actually

45. Id. at 397–98 (citing CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 68, 24).
46. Id. at 398.
47. Id. The court pointed out that Hahn “did not directly testify that he
thought he would not have to pay for the tag if the hunt was unsuccessful” and
also noted that Kinmon “did testify that he told Hahn he would cover the cost of
the tag if Hahn did not kill the bear.” Id. The court noted the same for Ailts,
acknowledging that “the trial testimony suggested that she also believed she was
in effect purchasing the tag at the time she filled out the paperwork to procure the
tag.” Id.
48. Id. at 401 (Harbison, J., dissenting).
49. State v. Chun, 1992 WL 12153276 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992) (unpublished)
(A-4283).
50. Kinmon, 451 P.3d at 398 (quoting Chun, 1992 WL 12153276 at •2–3).
51. Id. at 399.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 400–02 (Harbison, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 401 (emphasis added).
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purchased.55 Going on, Judge Harbison did not find Chun persuasive due
to the different set of codes in dispute: the present case involved Alaska’s
statutory code, which is clear in its meaning, while the Uniform
Commercial Code, at play in Chun, addresses when title has vested.56 The
judge concluded her analysis of the disputed statutory term, writing that
“[t]here is no ambiguity to the statutory requirement in Kinmon’s case
that a nonresident hunter must ‘purchase’ an appropriate tag before taking
the animal,” which includes paying money.57 Instead of the majority’s
“unnecessar[y] complicat[ion of] the meaning of an unambiguous
statute,” Judge Harbison would allow “previously purchasing” to retain
its plain meaning within this statutory context, requiring the nonresident
hunter who is accompanied by a guide to pay for a tag prior to the hunt
or taking of a big game animal.58

IV. A STATUTORY SOLUTION
The Alaska Court of Appeals wrongly decided Kinmon because of an
erroneous interpretation of the plain meaning of the statutory phrase
“previously purchasing” in section 16.05.340(a)(15), and improper
consideration of statutory context and the over-arching policy of the
statute. While future Alaska appellate courts can, and should, fix this
judicial error, the legislature should also step in and assert that the
purchase of big game tags must occur prior to the commencement of a
hunt.
Here, the court of appeals failed to provide the statutory phrase
“previously purchasing” with its “ordinary, contemporary, [and]
common meaning.”59 The court in Kinmon considered the dictionary
definitions provided by the State which define purchase as “the act or
instance of buying” and “to obtain by paying money or its equivalent,”
both of which would clearly indicate that a “purchase” is
contemporaneous with payment.60 In short, payment is necessary for a
purchase to have occurred. Common sense dictates that one does not
assert ownership of an item, such as a hunting tag, until the buyer has
committed the act of payment. Furthermore, “previously” is a
distinguishing mark that places the purchase of a tag prior to a future
55. Id. “[I]nstead, California uses the term ‘procure’ to refer to the method of
obtaining a game tag” while the term “purchase” “is used to govern the transfer
of lawfully and unlawfully taken fish and game,” which are distinctly different
activities. Id.
56. Id. at 401–02.
57. Id. at 402.
58. Id.
59. State v. Niedermeyer, 14 P.3d 265, 272 (Alaska 2000).
60. Kinmon, 451 P.3d at 397.
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action, such as a big game hunt. Judge Harbison noted that the statute
“clarifies that the transaction must be complete before the animal can be
taken.”61 A simple transaction for hunting tags should be distinguished
from the more complex contracts that do not require previous payment,
the latter of which Kinmon erroneously compared the former transactions
to.62 Unlike vehicles or real estate, hunting tags are simple one-time
transactions. Reading the phrase “previously purchasing” with its
common understanding, the court of appeals should have held the
hunting tag must have actually been bought before the hunt took place.
The State is also supported by the provision’s statutory context and
the legislature’s subsequent narrowing of the relevant statutory
provisions. As laid out in the State’s appellee brief, this specific statutory
provision operates within the context of the larger statutory scheme to
“ensure sustainable big game animal populations.”63 Other Alaska
statutes and regulations impose limitations on nonresidents conducting
big game hunting without local guides,64 detailed instructions on big
game hunting for religious purposes by Alaska Natives,65 and
requirements regarding big game kill sites.66 Subsequent redrafting of the
statutory provision in 1997 sheds additional light on the
legislature’s intent to provide greater restrictions on nonresident big
game hunting. Prior to 1997 there was no limiting language on
nonresident big game tags in section 16.05.340(a)(15); by inserting
the ”previously purchasing” language into the statute, the legislature
demonstrated an intent to tighten the requirements surrounding
nonresident big game hunting.67 Therefore, even if the court did find
“previous purchasing” ambiguous, that ambiguity is outweighed by the
provision’s legislative history and statutory context. Read together, these
statutory provisions mandate the appellate court to interpret a narrower
meaning of “previously purchasing,” which will also ensure state coffers
receive hunting tag revenue before all hunts, weakening the opportunity
for hunting guides to avoid purchasing tags following unsuccessful
hunts.
Furthermore, the Alaska Constitution provides an overarching
purpose for managing wildlife that commands a narrower interpretation
61. Id. at 401 (Harbison, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
62. See id. at 398–99 (majority opinion) (noting Kinmon’s argument that
“previously purchasing” could be interpreted to include “a binding promise to
pay in the near future”).
63. Opening Brief for Appellee State of Alaska at 1, Kinmon v. State, 451 P.3d
392 (Alaska Ct. App. 2019) (No. A-12645).
64. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.407 (2018).
65. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 92.017 (2019); id. § 92.019 (2019).
66. Id. § 92.012(e) (2019).
67. Id. § 16.05.340(a)(15) (enacted in 1997).
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of “previously purchasing.” Alaska’s detailed hunting regime, especially
for big game hunting, exists under the constitution’s mandate that
wildlife populations are “maintained on [a] sustained yield principle.”68
The Alaska Supreme Court has approvingly cited to the proper definition
of sustained yield principle proffered by the delegates of the Resources
Committee to the state’s constitutional convention: it “denotes conscious
application insofar as practicable of principles of management intended
to sustain the yield of the resource being managed” and is to hold a
“broad meaning” as used in the constitution.69 Operating under a broad
constitutional framework to protect wildlife resources such as big game,
the court of appeals should have interpreted “previously purchasing” in
the light most favorable to ensuring big game populations are responsibly
managed. Here, that would mean interpreting previously purchased as
requiring the buying of hunting tags before a guide takes a nonresident
on a hunt, strengthening the likelihood guides purchase tags for their
hunts, even if they are ultimately unsuccessful.
Not only is the statutory phrase “previously purchasing”
unambiguous, but the “sliding scale”70 approach used in Alaska canons
of construction require a narrower interpretation of the phrase which
mandates tags be paid for before hunts begin. Statutory context
(including numerous restrictions on big game hunting), the broader
constitutional purpose of preserving sustainable wildlife population, and
other canons of constructions all serve to strengthen rather than negate
the provision’s lack of ambiguity.
The policy behind requiring hunters to pay for the privilege of
hunting regardless of the success of their expedition is simple: to ensure
that the state receives the needed financial resources that are inherent in
successful wildlife management. The past decade alone has seen
nonresident tags provide ninety-seven percent of the $45,172,155 in
revenue from big game tags.71 If the appellate court’s holding goes
unaddressed, hunting guides can simply backdate successful big game
hunting tags while avoiding the purchase of tags for unsuccessful hunts.
Instead, the proper interpretation of the statute should require all big
game hunting tags to be purchased before hunters begin an expedition,
reducing the likelihood that unsuccessful hunters will avoid paying for
tags.
68. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 4.
69. West v. State, 248 P.3d 689, 695 (Alaska 2010) (quoting RESOURCES
COMMITTEE, ALASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, TERMS (1955)).
70. See Alaska Spine Ctr., LLC v. Mat-Su Valley Med. Ctr. LLC, 440 P.3d 176,
181 (Alaska 2019) (quoting Adamson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 333 P.3d 5, 11
(Alaska 2014)).
71. ALASKA DEP’T OF FISH AND GAME, supra note 26.
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Kinmon has unnecessarily complicated an unambiguous statute. The
court of appeals failed to perform any statutory interpretation besides
deciphering plain meaning, ignoring statutory context, narrowing of
subsequent iterations, and the over-arching purpose of the statute buoyed
by the Alaska Constitution. The legislature can and should address this
judicial error. By clarifying section 16.05.340(a)(15) as requiring the
buying of a hunting tag before the hunt, the legislature can remedy this
erroneous interpretation of the statute. To this end, section
16.05.340(a)(15) should be amended to read as follows, with the proposed
changes emphasized:
A nonresident may not take a big game animal without
purchasing, prior to the commencement of a hunt, a numbered,
nontransferable, appropriate tag, issued under this paragraph.
The tag must be affixed to the animal before leaving the kill site
and must remain affixed until the animal is prepared for storage,
consumed, or exported. A tag issued but not used for an animal
may be used to satisfy the tagging requirement for an animal of
any other species for which the tag fee is of equal or less value.

V. CONCLUSION
In Kinmon, the court of appeals not only erred in its interpretation of
the plain meaning of “previously purchasing” in section 16.05.340(a)(15)
of the Alaska Statutes, it also neglected to account for the policy
ramifications of its interpretation. This two-part error has left Alaska’s
statutory scheme regulating hunting weakened and less able to achieve
its intended purpose. To rectify this error, the Alaska legislature should
amend the language of section 16.05.340(a)(15) to clarify that the purchase
of big game tags must occur prior to the commencement of a hunt. This
change will allow the state to more effectively protect the practice of
hunting from unscrupulous and unlawful actors. Hunting, a cultural
pillar of Alaska, demands legal protection of a quality commensurate
with its importance to the state’s socio-economic identity.

